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I. INTRODUCTION
On Friday morning, April 30, 1993, employees of American Commerce
National Bank in Anaheim, California arrived for work in typical fash-
ion. Unbeknownst to them, by the end of the day, they would work not
for the bank, but instead for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC").' At three o'clock that afternoon, federal agents, including
members of the federal Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, along with local police officers, some brandishing weapons,
seized the financial institution by force.2 On the following Monday
morning,3 a banner outside the building covering the old American
Commerce National Bank sign4 read, "Southern California Bank."5
On the surface it appears that the story of American Commerce Na-
1. On April 30, 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") ap-
pointed the FDIC as sole receiver for American Commerce National Bank. See James
S. Granelli, U.S. Seizes Anaheim's American Commerce Bank, L.A. TIMES, May 1,
1993, at D3 (Orange County ed.).
2. After the seizure, bank regulators locked all the bank's doors and stationed
armed guards at each point of ingress or egress. Regulators allegedly destroyed any-
thing symbolic of the bank, including personal photos. In one instance, a regulator
allegedly ripped the picture of a bank director's five-year-old daughter, throwing it
into the trash while commenting, "this isn't needed anymore." See Complaint for
Plaintiffs at 28, Garner v. Blake, No. CV 93-6674 MRP (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1993).
3. On Monday, an article in the Los Angeles Times stated: "Federal banking regu-
lators, exercising for the first time new powers to seize financially healthy banks,
took over American Commerce National Bank on Friday and accused its operators of
concealing records, lying and wasting the bank's finances." Granelli, supra note 1, at
D2.
4. The FDIC sold $107,000,000 in American Commerce National Bank assets, along
with other assets such as the actual building and inside fixtures, to Southern Califor-
nia Bank for $110,000. See Ted Johnson, New Owner Will Reopen Seized Bank, LA.
TIMES, May 3, 1993, at D1 (Orange County ed.).
5. Id.
tional Bank exemplifies just one of the many bank failures in the 1980s
and 90s.' Simply lumping this bank into the category of common bank
failures, however, would be an unfortunate oversight. While the media
coverage of the April 30, 1993 takeover focused primarily on the board
of directors and top employees of American Commerce National Bank,'
the newspapers ignored a fundamental issue accompanying the seizure:
that it violated the United States Constitution.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") seized the
bank under federal legislation, known as the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"), that took effect De-
cember 19, 1992.8 This was the first time that banking regulators used
the new legislation to seize a solvent national bank.
Faced with an impending bank crisis that depleted billions of
taxpayers' dollars, Congress passed FDICIA to prevent banks from
reaching extreme levels of insolvency." In so doing Congress hoped to
strengthen the regulation of financial institutions 2 by granting federal
regulators the authority to intervene 3 in the affairs of national banks
significantly earlier than previous powers had permitted."
6. During the first six months of 1992, 61 banks with $19.9 billion in assets
failed. In 1993, for the same six month period, 22 banks with $2.7 billion in assets
failed. See generally Mark Glover, Did Any Escape Waco Inferno?, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 5, 1993, at Bi. Recapturing this money has been virtually impossible for the
various government agencies. "Although the S&L disaster is costing U.S. taxpayers an
estimated $180 billion, the [Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC")] has had surprisingly
little success in squeezing any money out of many of the executives who ran the
thrifts." Albert R. Karr, RTC Chases Billions From Failed Thrifts, But Nets Small
Change, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1994, at Al.
7. In his article on the savings and loan crisis, Lawrence White explained: "The
savings-and-loan ("S & L") debacle is in many ways an awful story - awful in both
senses of that word. But it is a story that has not been well reported in the press or
media, because the media focus is on anecdotes and personalities." Lawrence J.
White, The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S57 (1991).
8. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). The regulators seized American
Commerce National Bank specifically under 12 U.S.C. § 191. See generally 12 U.S.C.
§ 191 (1993).
9. See Johnson, supra note 4, at D1.
10. See Pub. L. No. 102-242, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 2236.
11. See generally ACUS Calls for Bank Exam Appeals Process and Judicial Re-
view of Agency Decisions, BNA BANKING DAiLY, June 22, 1993.
12. In her article on the banking industry, Sarah Hughes explained: "FDICIA's prin-
cipal aims were to recapitalize the Bank Insurance Fund, to protect the integrity of
the deposit insurance funds, and to protect the taxpayer from further bailouts of
those funds." Sarah Jane Hughes, Banking and Deposit Insurance: An Unfinished
Agenda for the 1990s, 68 IND. L.J. 835, 837-38 (1993).
13. In Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the court
noted: "Much of the history of the savings and loan . . . industry consists of financial
crisis followed by regulatory response." Id. at 800.
14. In a speech addressing a seminar on FDICIA, Edward W. Kelley, Jr., a member
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Under FDICIA, a bank need not be in a dire economic state to war-
rant federal action. Rather, the OCC has sole discretion to evaluate a
bank's individual status."6 The purpose behind such policies is to pre-
vent the deposit insurance system"6 from incurring significant losses."
A primary concern of FDICIA'" is to prevent insolvent banks from be-
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, stated:
There was a view held by many people that supervisors of insured de-
pository institutions were sometimes too slow in getting going, in identifying
troubled institutions, and were inclined to exercise too much forbearance in
working with the institutions that were developing serious problems.
It was concluded that on occasion steps weren't being taken very
promptly to address deficiencies so that problems were being allowed to
fester and dividends, for instance, were not being promptly curtailed, and
cost-cutting and other remedial actions were not being adequately pursued.
Edward Kelley, Address at a Georgetown University Law Center Seminar on the Feder-
al Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (Nov. 12, 1992) (transcript
available in The Reuter Transcript Report).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993). In her article on the savings and loan crisis, Mollie
Dickenson stated:
Government regulators have approached the so-called S&L crisis as if wide-
spread criminality applied to anyone with a pocket calculator. In the process,
it has seized hundreds of failing thrifts whose assets might have been pre-
served through sales and mergers. It has deemed "insolvent" some 500 sal-
vageable S&Ls, seizing them under interpretations of law Congress passed to
resolve the thrift crisis.
Mollie Dickenson, The Real S&L Scandal, WORTH, Sept. 1994, at 93, 95.
16. The deposit insurance system guarantees the necessary funds that allow the
FDIC to protect each depositor of member banks up to $100,000. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(1)(B) (1993).
17. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs explained:
The Committee is concerned that, without reform of the deposit insurance
system and the bank regulatory system, deposit insurance losses will continue
to mount. Accordingly, [FDICIA] makes fundamental changes in the way
banks are regulated. These changes will force regulators to take prompt cor-
rective action when an institution first experiences trouble and enable regu-
lators to take control of failing institutions before they run up losses to the
insurance fund.
S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. A (1991).
18. In signing FDICIA, President George Bush explained:
Unfortunately, the narrow legislation produced by the Congress does little
more than provide critical funding to the Bank Insurance Fund. While it in-
cludes some of the regulatory reforms . . . it does nothing to restore the
competitiveness of the banking industry .... This shortsighted congressional
response to the problems we face increases taxpayer exposure to bank
losses.
coming an excessive drain on the FDIC.9 In an effort to achieve this,
Congress provided federal banking regulators an avenue by which they
could seize solvent banks which are not in immediate risk of insolven-
cy.
20
While public policy dictates the need to mitigate the effects of the
current banking crisis, FDICIA is not the answer.2 Under FDICIA, Con-
gress has unmistakably violated the constitutional protections of sol-
vent, and to a lesser degree, insolvent financial institutions.' FDICIA
directly conflicts with two fundamental constitutional provisions af-
forded to national banks: the Takings Clause' and procedural due pro-
cess? requirements.
Part II of this Comment provides a historical background and dis-
cussion of the traditional regulation of financial institutions, tracing the
evolution of FDICIA.n
Part III discusses the unconstitutionality of FDICIA in two distinct
areas." First, FDICIA as it applies to solvent banks is a direct violation
Statement by President George Bush upon signing S. 543, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1873 (Dec. 23, 1991).
19. The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 stat. 162 (codified as amended in 12
U.S.C. §§ 24, 1811 and other scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), established the FDIC,
providing the federal government with a vehicle with. which it could insure qualified
banks. Originally, the government offered insurance only to members of the Federal
Reserve System, but it has long since provided the same insurance opportunity to
non-member state banks. The deposit insurance must be maintained in order for the
system of government-insured financial institutions to exist. See generally EDWARD L.
SYMONS, JR. AND JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 41 (2d ed. 1984).
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
21. One commentator noted:
The FDICIA not only reflects the dominance of deposit insurance in
federal banking regulation, but also Congress's inability to enact structural
banking reforms that would increase opportunities for banks to compete prof-
itably with other financial service providers. To the extent Congress failed to
include structural banking reforms in the FDICIA, it merely postponed action
necessary for the future health of the banking industry and, ultimately, for
the integrity of the deposit insurance funds.
Hughes, supra note 12, at 836.
22. One legal scholar stated: "The past five years have witnessed the most sweep-
ing banking regulation since the worldwide banking collapse of the 1930s. The result
is a Byzantine regulatory structure of interrelated statutes, some with truly Draconian
provisions, whose ultimate effect upon capital markets is as yet unknown." Patrick
Crawford, Note, Inefficiency and Abuse of Process in Banking Regulation: Asset Sei-
zures, Law Firms, and the Ricoization of Banking Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 205, 205-06
(1993) (footnotes omitted).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. See infra notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 82-214 and accompanying text.
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of the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.2 Second, Title
12 of the United States Code, Section 191' violates due process re-
quirements' since it provides no notice or opportunity for a hearing
when the FDIC is appointed receiver for solvent institutions.' Section
191 grants the OCC exclusive authority to appoint the FDIC as receiver
for any bank under the parameters of several discretionary factors,31
all without notice or a hearing.'
Part IV describes the arbitrary and capricious standard of review that
applies to regulatory takeovers by federal agencies.' The seizure of
American Commerce National Bank typifies the unconstitutional nature
of FDICIA by the OCC's abuse of power under 12 U.S.C. § 191.'
FDICIA grants the OCC authority to seize banks without any constitu-
tional safeguards. Thus, the arbitrary and capricious standard inherently
lends itself to abuse, while the OCC remains virtually outside the realm
of judicial scrutiny.'
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. This section states, in relevant part:
§ 191. Appointment of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver.
The Comptroller of the Currency may, without prior notice or hearings,
appoint a receiver for any national bank (and such receiver shall be the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation if the national bank is an insured
bank ... ) if the Comptroller determines, in the Comptroller's discretion,
that
(1) 1 or more of the grounds specified in section 1821(c)(5) of this title ex-
ist ....
12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993) (emphasis added).*
29. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
30. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
31. See infra note 49 for a list of these discretionary factors.
32. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
33. See infra notes 215-37 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 215-37 and accompanying text.
35. When reversing the decision of a government agency, including the OCC,
courts are held to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. See Franklin Sav.
Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 1142 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding a
receivership appointment to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); Syracuse Peace Council v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 867 F.2d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding the Federal Communications
Commission to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1019 (1990); Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1406 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that a receiver may be appointed under the proper arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Gregory v. Mitchell, 459
F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (holding that the State Banking Board was held
to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review). See generally Dickenson, supra
II. BACKGROUND
On December 19, 1991, Congress passed FDICIA.1 The Act was a di-
rect congressional response to the frustrating problems of federal de-
posit insurance.37
The increase in bank failures in the last two decades? has resulted
in a significant drain upon the Bank Insurance Fund ("BIF"). Since the
FDIC' insures both commercial banks and savings and loans, the BIF
is the portion of FDIC funds designated to protect the banks and bank
depositors in the event of insolvency or other financial misfortune.'
By insuring these institutions," the FDIC minimizes the concern of
bank runs.' But if the BIF can no longer cover failed institutions, the
threat of panicked depositors may once again return to the nation's
banking industry.-
FDICIA comes only two years after the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA")." In the 1980s,
note 15.
36. Pub. L No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 22336 (1991). The goal of FDICIA is as follows:
"By systemically reforming the banking regulatory scheme, FDICIA attempts to mini-
mize the losses taxpayers incur when the Bank Insurance Fund ("BIF") has insuffi-
cient capital to finance a bank failure." Jamie C. Mann & Barbara J. Ellis, Develop-
ments in Banking Law, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 1 (1992).
37. Prior to FDICIA, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC")
failed, along with myriad institutions insured by FSLIC, costing taxpayers ap-
proximately $200 billion. See generally Richard S. Carnell, Prompt Corrective Action
Under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, PLI COMM. L & PRACTICE COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES NO. 625/27 (1992).
38. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1905. "During the 1970s, only
76 banks failed, compared to nearly 1000 in the 1980s. Between 1943 and 1981 the
greatest number of banks that failed in any one year was 17 (1976). In 1988, 221
banks failed." Id.
39. Historically, the FSLIC insured savings and loans while the FDIC insured mem-
ber commercial banks. Now, the FDIC insures both. See generally SYMONS & WHITE,
supra note 19.
40. A major tool of banking reform in the 1930s was the Banking Act of 1933
(also known as "Glass-Steagall"). The Act separated commercial from investment
banking while establishing federal deposit insurance. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,
48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 1811 and other scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.). See generally Crawford, supra note 22, at 205 n.4.
41. The Federal Reserve Act in June of 1933 established the FDIC, which insured
bank deposits beginning in 1934. See generally Crawford, supra note 22, at 205 n.4.
42. See generally Carnell, supra note 37.
43. In the event of a truly catastrophic series of banks failures, the BIF could
never completely insure all depositors. See SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 19, at 708.
44. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). Congress, in passing FIRREA, encour-
aged the banking agencies to "aggressively utilize this new authority." H.R. Rep. No.
101-222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 440 (1989). For a further discussion on FIRREA, see
Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itse: Revising and Reshaping the
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Congress altered the entire regulatory structure through FIRREA, and
"[pirofessionals active in the banking industry Were surprised by the
extensive powers, prerogatives and perquisites given federal banking
regulators. " ' FIRREA significantly changed the nature of the banking
industry, and left the door wide open for FDICIA." Both acts vest sub-
stantial authority in bank regulators while arguably usurping individual
bank autonomy. 7
In 1991, Congress passed FDICIA, which substantially modified the
text of section 191, the receivership section, of Title 12.' Section 191
now states:
Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. U. 1117 (1989). For
an expanded discussion on regulatory implementation of FIRREA, see Dickenson,
supra note 15.
45. Charles L. O'Brien & Lisa M. Cavage, FIRREA: Retroactive Application, Due
Process Issues, Right-Duty Analysis and the Statute of Limitations, 108 BANiENG U.
308, 308 (1991).
46. O'Brien and Cavage further noted:
FIRREA, which was introduced to correct the managerial excesses of the
1980s, may produce regulatory excesses for the 1990s. The statute was ex-
pressly designed to 'strengthen the enforcement powers of [flederal regulators
of depository institutions' and to 'strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal
penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and
their depositors.'
Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. §§ 101(9), 101(10)).
47. "Some bank regulators are now enthusiastically testing the limits of these new
and expanded powers .... As a result, directors and officers of banks . . . may soon
be the targets of investigations and prosecutions for actions that in the context of
day-to-day bank management, were well intentioned and appropriate." Id. For a de-
tailed discussion of several egregious regulatory takeovers, see Dickenson, supra note
15. In her article, Dickenson discusses at length several bank seizures and the per-
sonal stories behind the institutions. Id.
48. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993). Senator Donald Riegle made the following state-
ments at a Senate Banking Committee hearing regarding FDICIA
On December 19, [1992] the FDIC will implement a new statutory mandate, a
new law enacted in last year's banking reform bill, that requires regulators to
take prompt corrective action to resolve the problems of failing banks ....
[Tihese reforms were designed to protect America's taxpayers against further
losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance System .... However, many sea-
soned and reputable observers disagree sharply about the extent of the bank
problems and what the cost of pending bank failures will be to the FDIC in
the period after December 19th.
Possible Bank Closings in December of 1992: Hearings Before the Committee on
Banking and Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement by Senator Donald
Riegle).
The Comptroller of the Currency may, without prior notice or hearings, appoint a
receiver for any national bank (and such receiver shall be the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation if the national bank is an insured bank... ) if the Comp-
troller determines, In the Comptroller's discretion, that (1) 1 or more of the
grounds specified in section 1821(c)(5) of this title exist."
This Comment argues that 12 U.S.C. § 191 is unconstitutional.' To ex-
plain this position, a comparison must be made between the old provi-
sions of title 12 and the new sections under FDICIA.
Prior to the 1991 amendments, Section 191 read as follows:
Whenever any national banking association shall be dissolved, and its rights,
privileges, and franchises declared forfeited, as prescribed in section 93 of this ti-
tle... "or whenever the comptroller shall become satisfied of the insolvency of
49. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993) (emphasis added). Section 1821(c)(5) states, in pertinent
part:
(5) Grounds for appointing conservator or receiver
The grounds for appointing a conservator or receiver ... for any in-
sured depository institution are as follows:
[B] Substantial dissipation
Substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to - -
(i) any violation of any statute or regulation; or
(ii) any unsafe or unsound practice ...
[C] Unsafe or unsound condition
An unsafe or unsound condition to transact business ...
[D] Cease and desist orders
Any willful violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become fi-
nal...
[E] Concealment
Any concealment of the institution's books, papers, records, or assets, or
any refusal to submit the institution's books, papers, records, or affairs
for inspection to any examiner or to any lawful agent of the appropriate
Federal banking agency ...
[HI Violations of law
Any violation of any law or regulation, or any unsafe or unsound prac-
tice or condition that is likely to
(i) cause insolvency or substantial dissipation of assets or earnings;
(ii) weaken the institution's condition; or
(lii) otherwise seriously prejudice the institution's depositors or the de-
posit insurance fund.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5) (1993).
50. For a full discussion, see infra notes 82-214 and accompanying text.
51. Section 93 remains substantially unchanged and states in pertinent part:
If the directors of any national banking association shall knowingly vio-
late, or knowingly permit any of the officers . .. to violate any of the provi-
sions of this chapter, all the rights, privileges, and franchises of the associa-
tion shall be thereby forfeited. Such violation shall, however, be determined
and adjudged by a proper district or Territorial court of the United States
in a suit brought for that purpose by the Comptroller of the Currency.
[Vol. 22: 131, 19941 National Bank Seizures
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
a national banking association, he may, after due examination of its affairs, in ei-
ther case, appoint a receiver, who shall proceed to close up such association."
Section 191 previously applied both to violations of the banking code
under section 93, and bank insolvency.' Section 93, pertaining to viola-
tions, affords sufficient procedural due process by requiring that such de-
cisions under section 191 "be determined and adjudged by a proper dis-
trict or Territorial court."' FDICIA, conversely, permits the appointment
of a receiver "without prior notice or hearings"' when the Comptroller
of the Currency decides, at his discretion,' that the bank in question
has violated a particular provision of section 1821(c)(5).
Historically, section 1821(c)(5)' gave no hint of the broad authority
established under FDICIA.T Prior to the enactment of FDICIA, section
1821(c)(5) applied specifically to "the appointment of the [FDIC] as...
receiver for any insured State depository institution."' The logic be-
hind this statute is sound. When a receiver is appointed for a state bank,
such appointment is done according to state law,"' but the FDIC still in-
sures the depositors of those FDIC insured banks. Therefore, it is in the
interest of the FDIC to control the receivership to mitigate against the
drain on the insurance fund. There is nothing inherently unconstitutional
in this form of receivership, assuming that adequate protections are in
place under existing state law.'
It is important to note that under the old statutes the Comptroller of
the Currency does not make any decisions on his own, but instead coop-
12 U.S.C. § 93 (1990), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1993) (emphasis added) (current
version applies specifically to civil money penalties and liability of bank directors).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1990), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
53. Id.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1993).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
56. Id. This discretion carries with it the seemingly insurmountable arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. See Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
934 F.2d 1127, 1142 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5) (1993).
58. See supra note 49, for full text.
59. 12 U.S.C. 1821(c)(5) (1991), amended by 12 U.S.C. 1821(c)(5) (1993).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. For example, the California Finance Code § 3110 states, in pertinent part: "The
superintendent may, with the approval of the court and of the superintendent, sell
any part or the whole business of the bank to any other bank." CAL. FIN. CODE
§ 3110.1(a) (West 1993) (emphasis added). See also infra note 65 for other state
statutes.
62. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
erates in conjunction with the individual state authority to decide when
to appoint the receiver.' The FDIC only becomes involved after such
state authority renders its decision upon consultation with appropriate
authorities.' Furthermore, the decision to appoint a receiver, at the
point in which the FDIC takes control, has already survived the proce-
dural scrutiny afforded by the various state constitutions and respective
statutes.'
After FDICIA, the amended version of section 1821(c)(5) states: "The
grounds for appointing a conservator or receiver (which may be the
Corporation) for any insured depository institution are as fol-
lows ... ."' Previously, the protections inherent in section 1821(c)(5)
were the various state provisions for notice and a hearing. 7 Under
FDICIA, section 1821(c)(5), coupled with the triggering provision of sec-
tion 191, affords no procedural protection. The state review process
63. Under the old provisions of § 1821(c)(4), the FDIC could appoint itself sole
receiver of any insured state bank if a violation under § 1821(c)(5) existed "at the
time - (I) the . . . receiver . . . was appointed; or (II) such institution was
closed ...or . . . at any time (I) during the appointment of the ...receiver...
or (II) while such institution is closed." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4) (1991). However,
§ 1821(c)(9)(A) states: "The appropriate Federal banking agency may appoint the
[FDIC] as sole receiver ... of any insured State depository institution, after consul-
tation with the appropriate State supervisor . . " if the appropriate provisions are
triggered. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(9)(A) (1991), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(9)(A)
(1993). Thus, under the old provisions, the OCC had some input regarding state re-
ceiverships but not sole discretion.
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(9)(A) (1991), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(9)(A)
(1993).
65. See supra note 61 for the applicable California statute. Several states also have
similar provisions. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-395 (1993), states in pertinent part: "If
the status of a bank as an insured bank is terminated by the [FDIC] the superinten-
dent may immediately take possession and control of the bank and in such event
shall, through the attorney general, apply to the superior court for the appointment
of a receiver for the bank." Id. (emphasis added). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1709
(1992), states in pertinent part: "The Attorney General, on notice by the State Bank
Commissioner, shall institute ... [receivership] proceedings against the [bank] by due
process of law." Id. (emphasis added). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1301 (1992), provides that
the State Commissioner revoke the license of a bank "after a hearing or an opportu-
nity for a hearing has been given to such bank." Id. According to MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 487.551 (West 1993), the State Commissioner, in order to appoint a receiver
for any State bank, "shall apply to the circuit court for the county in which the bank
is located for the appointment of a receiver for the bank." Id. Finally, the V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 9, § 151 (1992), provides that the Banking Board "shall apply to the District
Court for the appointment of a receiver." Id.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5) (1993) (emphasis added). Note that the section now ap-
plies "for any insured" bank, as opposed to the old language stating "for any insured
State" bank.
67. See supra notes 63 and 65.
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previously applicable under 1821(c)(5) is now eliminated.' Therefore,
federal banks are subject to the sole discretion of the Comptroller of the
Currency,' who takes his authority from a statute which previously ap-
plied only to state banks and that inherently provided for procedural due
process.'
Section 1821(c)(7) provided one additional safeguard when the FDIC
appointed itself receiver under sections 1821(c)(4) and 1821(c)(5). Sec-
tion 1821(c)(7) states: "If the [FDIC] appoints itself as... receiver under
paragraph (4), the insured State depository institution may... bring an
action in the United States district court... for the District of Columbia,
for an order requiring the [FDIC] to remove itself as such... receiv-
er.""' This section ensured that all banks subject to receiverships ob-
tained adequate procedural protection.' FDICIA eliminated these con-
stitutional safeguards."
The responsibility of enforcing FDICIA with respect to national banks
rests primarily with the OCC.'4 In administering congressional intent,m
the OCC enjoys substantial legal immunity, and "[clourts have.., gen-
erally accorded a high degree of deference to the Comptroller's deci-
68. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
69. See infra notes 215-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the arbitrary
and capricious standard to which the OCC is held.
70. See supra note 63.
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7) (1991).
72. Id.
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
74. In THE REGULATION OF BANKING, Michael Malloy explained:
The Comptroller, no longer concerned with the issuance of currency by na-
tional banks, now functions as the administrator of national banks chartered
by him under the National Bank Act. He and his staff constitute a bureau of
the Department of the Treasury, and they are responsible for the administra-
tion of virtually all federal laws applicable to national banks.
MICHAEL MALLOY, THE REGULATION OF BANKING 62 (1992).
75. The Comptroller explained:
The OCC has several tools available to carry out its supervisory responsibili-
ties, and Congress has given the agency broad discretion in the use of these
tools .... The more commonly used actions vary in severity, ranging from
the least severe commitment letters to cease and desist orders. The OCC also
has the authority to impose civil money penalties and to order the removal
of bank officers and directors. Finally, in appropriate circumstances, it can
revoke a bank's charter.,
Id. at 722.
sions.- 7
There are limits, however, to the OCC's decision-making authority. In
Camp v. Pitts," the Supreme Court held that the proper standard of
review for -the Comptroller was arbitrary, capricious, and outside the
realm of the law.'8 Furthermore, in Association of Data Processing Ser-
vice Organizations v. Camp,' the Supreme Court found "no evidence
that Congress in either the Bank Service Corporation Act or the National
Bank Act sought to preclude judicial review of administrative rulings by
the Comptroller as to the legitimate scope of activities available to na-
tional banks."'
In legislating the provisions of FDICIA, the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs criticized the OCC's inept control of the
banking crisis."1 Taking the hint, the OCC apparently has launched a ver-
itable crusade to re-regulate the banking industry and strictly enforce the
FDICIA. Pait IV of this Comment addresses the actions of the OCC in
enforcing the provisions of the FDICIA.
I. 12 U.S.C. SECTION 191 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. Takings Clause
The Takings Clause states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation."' Under 12
U.S.C. § 191,' the OCC may appoint a receiver for a national bank. Re-
garding solvent financial institutions, this is tantamount to an unconstitu-
tional taking.
Traditionally, the appointment of a receiver applied primarily to insol-
vent institutions." After the 1991 amendments,' however, solvent
76. Id. at 62.
77. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
78. Id. at 1.42.
79. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
80. Id. at 1.57.
81. The Senate Committee noted it was "concerned that regulators have too often
delayed in resolving the problems of troubled institutions. Numerous witnesses before
the Committee identified such delay as a significant factor in the problems of both
the thrift and commercial banking industries and recommended adoption of legislation
to encourage prompt corrective action." S. Rep. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
82. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
83. 12 U.S.C. § 191 states, in pertinent part: "The Comptroller of the Currency
may, without prior notice or hearings, appoint a receiver for any national bank . . .
if the Comptroller determines . . . (1) 1 or more of the grounds specified in section
1821(c)(5) of this title exist." 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
84. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1990), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
85. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
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banks were just as vulnerable to receiverships as insolvent banks.' Pri-
or to the enactment of the FDICIA, title 12 of the United States Code
authorized federal regulators to seize insolvent banks.' Because reg-
ulators can now seize solvent banks under legislation that historically
applied only to insolvent banks, such authority constitutes a taking of
property without just compensation, and hence is a direct violation of
the Takings Clause.
Generally, when the OCC seizes an insolvent bank, there is no taking
because there is nothing to "take" per se.' The very insolvency of the
institution leaves the shareholders with no property value, and hence no
application of the Fifth Amendment' because there is no reason for
"just compensation."' Furthermore, the government receives no gain
from an insolvent institution, but instead must fund depositors from the
BIF.9'
This reasoning, however, cannot be applied to solvent institutions.
When the OCC seizes a solvent institution, there may be a corresponding
deprivation of property, and therefore the very nature of the Fifth
Amendment comes into question because "private property [is] taken for
public use, without just compensation."' Furthermore, the government
receives a substantial benefit when it seizes a solvent institution because
the government can issue refunds to depositors by utilizing funds within
the seized bank instead of the BIF.' Therefore, the historical argument
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5) lists a number of discretionary factors under which the
OCC can appoint a receiver, regardless of solvency. See supra note 49 for a com-
plete list.
87. Historically, the OCC used 12 U.S.C. §§ 93, 191, 481, and 1818 to seize insol-
vent banks. See supra notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
88. The only "taking" that generally occurs is that of physical property, such as
office furniture. While this could be substantial, it often has a depreciated value and
must not be confused with other assets of a bank and the actual value of that bank
to shareholders.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
90. Id.
91. In Golden Pacific Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the
court upheld the taking of an insolvent institution, focusing primarily on the regula-
tion intensive nature of the banking industry. Id. at 1076. However, the court noted
that, had Golden Pacific been solvent, the argument would rest with a due process
issue and not a takings issue. Id. at 1075-76. Such logic fails to adequately consider
the principles advanced by the three distinct elements of the Takings Clause dis-
cussed below. This shortsighted decision-making process, adopted by the courts when
dealing with the federal government, is a trend that must end.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
93. Sometimes, however, mismanagement within the OCC and FDIC prevents the
that the seizure of an insolvent institution is a legitimate "taking" is not
sound when applied to solvent banks.
Whether a taking has occurred in the general sense is difficult to deter-
mine," and within the framework of banking litigation, the issue can be
quite nebulous. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,'
the Supreme Court addressed the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment" in light of a New York City statute affecting Grand Central Ter-
minal. 7 The Court noted:
While this Court has recognized that the 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee [is] de-
signed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,' this
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government, rather than on a few persons.'
Disclaimers aside, the Court established three factors in determining
whether a taking has occurred: "[1] The economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant... [2] the extent to which the regulation has in-
terfered with distinct investment-backed expectations... and [3] the
character of governmental action." '
government from reaping any financial benefit and instead costs taxpayers money. See
generally Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir.
1991) (discussing the possibility of improper regulatory takeover), cert. denied 112 S.
Ct. 1475 (1992). But see Lincoln Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901
(D.D.C. 1990) (exemplifying a clear case for regulatory action).
94. The court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), explained: 'The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the
Fifth amendment has proven to be a problem of considerable difficulty." Id. at 123.
95. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
96. U.S. CONST. amend V.
97. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122.
98. Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
99. Id. at 124. In an opposing view, Christopher Curtis argued that banks
"[o]rganized in corporate or quasi-corporate form . . . are legal persons and not natu-
ral persons. As entities, they are legal fictions." Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings
Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375
(1990). Therefore, the approach to takings set out in Penn Central would not apply.
This is the quintessential issue in deciding whether there is a violation of the Takings
Clause. Curtis failed to consider these three factors in light of solvent financial insti-
tutions. However, Curtis further argued that "[taking over a legal entity is not sim-
ple .... [T]o determine whether a taking has occurred, one must analyze the effect
of the challenged regulatory action on the bundle of rights that make up the legal
entity." Id. Perhaps this logic hints at Curtis' insight into the possible depth of regu-
latory action, although Curtis did not consider this in his final analysis.
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1. Economic Impact
The first factor, economic impact on the claimant,'® is the most sig-
nificant factor with respect to solvent financial institutions. In discussing
the economic impact factor, the First Circuit in McAndrews v. Fleet Bank
of Massachusetts0' noted: "The hallmark of an unconstitutional taking,
is... the denial of the 'economically viable use of [an owner's]
land.'"'" Furthermore, even statutes based in strong public policy can
just as easily result in an invalid "taking" under an economic impact
analysis." In these situations it is important to note the expectations of
the claimant, the nature of the taking, and the public policy rationale in-
volved."4
When the OCC seizes a financial institution, the taking is similar to the
one at issue in McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts."° When a
bank becomes insolvent, however, it has theoretically lost any right to
the property; it is as if its license to conduct business hinged upon main-
taining a certain solvency level. Based on this reasoning, a solvent insti-
100. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
101. 989 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1993).
102. Id. at 18 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see also
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (holding that airplane flights above
claimant's chicken farm were an unconstitutional taking); Portsmouth Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327, 330 (1922) (holding that the repeated firing of guns on a mili-
tary base constituted a taking of claimant's land); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that a New York Law requiring land-
lords to allow television cable companies to install such facilities in their apartment
buildings, even though the fixtures occupied less than one and a half cubic feet of
property, constituted a taking).
103. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (holding that a
Pennsylvania statute making the mining of coal commercially impracticable, but for
public policy reasons, was invalid as constituting a taking).
104. The Court in Penn Central recognized that:
[Iln a wide variety of contexts ... government may execute laws or pro-
grams that adversely affect recognized economic values. Exercises of the
taxing power are one obvious example. A second are the decisions in which
this Court has dismissed "taking" challenges on the ground that, while the
challenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with
interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of
the claimant to constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes.
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
105. 989 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1993). In McAndrews, though, the court addresses only
the narrow issue of a terminated lease as a result of the appointment of FDIC as
receiver for the bank.
tution should not be penalized in this fashion because it has successfully
maintained an adequate level of capital.
When a receiver is appointed for a national bank, the shareholders of
that bank lose all use of the institution in addition to the value of their
investments."° When the OCC seizes an insolvent institution, although
the shareholders lose all use and value of the institution, the loss is in-
consequential because, in theory, their stock in the bank is worthless. On
the other hand, a shareholder of a solvent institution loses significant
monetary value, valuable stock, and thus experiences a substantial depri-
vation of property rights.
2. Investment-Backed Expectations
The second factor in determining whether an unconstitutional taking
has occurred focuses on the interference with investment-backed expec-
tations. 7 Key to understanding this factor is found in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon."° In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court held
that a Pennsylvania statute forbidding mining, which would cause the
subsidence of any house, was an unconstitutional taking." The Court
reasoned that the Pennsylvania statute rendered the owner of a coal
mine unable to mine the coal from land that he owned."' While the
Court in Pennsylvania Coal recognized the important public policy con-
siderations advanced by the statute, the protection of the dwellings, it
concluded that "a state statute that substantially furthers important pub-
lic policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as
to amount to a 'taking.'""'
In analyzing the nature of the investment-backed expectations of finan-
cial institutions, it is critical to examine the regulatory context underly-
ing their very existence."' Clearly, any bank owner expects that the
106. Significant cases on regulatory taldngs pale in comparison to the seizures of
solvent financial institutions. In Penn Central, the claimant merely lost an investment
opportunity; in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1986), the
claimants lost the right to exclude others from a small portion of their property, and
in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the claimants
lost their property right in continued employment.
107. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
108. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
109. Id. at 416.
110. Id. at 398.
111. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393). The
Court in Penn Central further added that the statute "had nearly the same effect as
the complete destruction of rights claimant had reserved from the owners of the
surface land." Id.; see also Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908)
(holding that height restrictions on property constituted an illegal taking).
112. Regarding the rights of a landlord in relation to the termination of a lease
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government will closely monitor all activity and that a seizure may occur
should the institution become insolvent."' However, the nature of
FDICIA transcends any reasonable bounds of expectancy because no
shareholders of a solvent institution would ever expect the instantaneous
appointment of a receiver due to "discretionary" factors. 4 determined
solely at the whim of the OCC."' Perhaps bank executives should ex-
pect such regulatory action in the event their financial institutions show
a consistent loss and are bordering on insolvency. However, this is not
the case when a solvent bank consistently makes a profit at the end of
each quarter.
If the bottom-line is to protect the BIF and the stability of the FDIC,
the regulatory authority under FDICIA is even more unjustifiable. A prof-
itable bank certainly does not drain the insurance fund because, by defi-
nition, an institution with a positive net worth will have sufficient assets
to pay off depositors if a liquidation is necessary. Absent the need to
take a solvent bank in the interests of preserving FDIC funds, the OCC
should have no other authority to take a solvent bank at all."' For this
reason, there is no way to characterize this particular taking other than
as unconstitutional.
3. Character of the Government Action
The third and final factor is the character of the government action."7
The most important issue involving this factor is whether the government
uses the property for its own means."8 In McAndrews, the court ex-
plains that the taking of appellant's property under FIRREA was not
unconstitutional, but was merely an illustration of how the regulation
"reallocate[s] pluses and minuses," and that "'Congress routinely creates
upon appointment of the FDIC as receiver for a bank, the court in McAndrews, ex-
plains that "[tihose who deal with firms in regulated industries must expect that their
dealings will from time to time be affected by statutory and regulatory changes."
McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, 989 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1993).
113. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1990), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5) (1993).
115. The OCC, once again, is held to an arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view. See supra note 35.
116. In Penn Central, the Court explains in dicta that an act may constitute an
unconstitutional taking if it is "not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a sub-
stantial public purpose." Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127.
117. Id. at 124.
118. Id.
burdens for some that directly benefit others.""'9 In the context of sol-
vent institutions, however, the issue is reallocation and the extent of gov-
ernment balancing.'" Because there is no need to protect taxpayers
from solvent banks, only the government benefits.'2
Some may argue that the government is not appropriating any value
for itself when it takes over an institution under the guise of regulatory
authority."n When the institution is solvent, however, the government is
never obligated to refund proceeds above the deposits.1" Instead, the
government might apply such funds to further insure the FDIC against
any future bank failures, especially those flirting with insolvency.2 '
Ultimately, the government's action serves governmental interests exclu-
sively, and hence the taking of a solvent institution amounts to an uncon-
stitutional taking.
4. Conclusion
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,"n the Supreme Court
discussed the scope of the Takings Clause2 ' in light of the Pennsylva-
nia Coal27 decision. The Court noted:
Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon... that if the protection against physical ap-
119. McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, 989 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1993)
(quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986)).
120. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court balanced direct
flights above plaintiff's land with the need for the flights and found a taking. Id. at
261-62.
121. Commenting on the Causby decision, the court in Penn Central explained that
"Causby emphasized that Government had not 'merely destroyed property [but was]
using a part of it for the flight of its planes.'" Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. at 104, 128 (1978) (quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 262-63).
122. Under the guise of FIRREA, this argument is made by Curtis, supra note 99,
at 381. Curtis compares a regulatory seizure to a bankruptcy proceeding where the
bankruptcy court seeks to preserve some value for debt holders. Id. In such a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, therefore, the government does not generally protect its own inter-
ests but, instead, the interests of others. Id.
123. Under FDICLA, the government protects the insurance fund and the financial
strength of the FDIC, which, although indirectly benefitting taxpayers, provides a
direct benefit to the government.
124. This argument is analogous to that of justiciability and taxpayer standing. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that federal taxpayers lack standing to challenge
unconstitutional federal expenditures because the injury is too remote. See generally
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Hence, taxpay-
ers cannot refuse to pay taxes. Their only potential recourse is to find a federal ex-
penditure made pursuant to the spending clause is in violation of the constitution.
125. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
127. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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propriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the
government's power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership
of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits .... If instead,
the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated
qualification under the police power, "the natural tendency of human nature
[would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappear[ed]."... These considerations gave birth... to the oft-cited maxim
that, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."'
The over-regulated nature of the banking industry unfortunately often
clouds the real constitutional issues."u Congress and the regulators may
lose sight of the direct and unlawful violations involving the institutions
which they regulate, occurring virtually on a daily basis."n Therefore, it
is necessary to reexamine'3 ' all regulations that exist unchecked by judi-
cial scrutiny. With solvent banks especially, the uncompensated taking
under FDICIA is an example of an egregious constitutional violation.
B. Procedural Due Process
In 1991 Congress passed FDICIA,ln which substantially modified the
text of section 191.I" By passing FDICIA, Congress intended to create a
"system of prompt regulatory action ... premised on the realization...
that the longer an insolvent [or solvent] insured depository institution is
allowed to remain open, the more it will ultimately cost to resolve the
institution.""34
The sweeping nature of the 1991 FDICIA amendments, however, de-
nies federal institutions procedural due process.'" While FDICIA affords
128. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892-93 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
129. The real constitutional issues relate to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
130. In a discussion on basic takings, the Court in Lucas explains that, in the case
of permanent deprivations, the Court has "refused to allow the government to decree
it anew (without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted 'public interests'
involved." Id. at 2900.
131. The courts should reexamine the takings issues, not in light of banking regula-
tions, but instead, in light of the Constitution.
132. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
133. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
134. Pub. L. 102-242, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1916 (1991).
135. In a May 1993 report, the Administrative Conference of the United States ar-
gued that "[blanks and thrifts should have an appeals process to go through to dis-
pute examinations findings, and there should be an opportunity for judicial review of
final banking agency decisions in this area." ACUS Calls for Bank Exam Appeals
Process and Judicial Review of Agency Decisions, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC.
procedural protections following the dismissal of executive officers,'"
the reclassification'37 of an institution based on supervisory criteria oth-
er than capital,'" the execution of a cease and desist order,1" and the
BANIaNG DAiLY, June 22, 1993, at 1. When an institution becomes insolvent, federal
regulators justify a prompt takeover without notice as a preventive measure to avoid
a run on the institution. As exemplified by recent bank failures, however, the BIF
has been fully capable of covering such deposits on the various failed institutions.
Therefore, Congress' strong regulatory actions not only violate the Constitution's due
process provisions, but they are completely unnecessary. In the last few decades, the
agencies have committed to an archaic practice without any concern for the protec-
tion of the banks. Furthermore, there is virtually no need for prompt action without
notice with solvent banks. By definition, these solvent banks have even less of a
chance of burdening the insurance fund. Although the bank regulators must keep a
watchful eye on all banks to ensure that even the most solvent of banks maintain
their solvency, the Constitution must be preserved.
136. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(n)(1) (1993). This section states that "[a] director or senior
executive officer [of a bank] dismissed pursuant to an order . . .may obtain review
of that order by filing a written petition for reinstatement with the appropriate Fed-
eral banking agency." Id.
137. This Comment does not discuss in great detail the technical nature of capital
reclassification and subsequent prompt corrective action. For further examination of
the topic, see the full text of 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.1-6.25 and 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (1993). See
also S. Rep. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (addressing the various provisions
of Prompt Corrective Action legislation). The following table summarizes the capital
levels for the four capitalization categories:
PCA CAPITAL TOTAL TIER I TIER I




Capitalized ?10.096 a6.096 ?5.096
Adequately
Capitalized 8.0% >4.096 24.06
Under-
Capitalized <8.096 <4.096 <4.0%
Significantly
Under <6.0% <3.096 <3.096
Fed. Banking L Rep. (CCH) 60,520XX (Banking Cir. 268 Feb. 25, 1993).
138. 12 C.F.R. § 6.4 (1993). This section states that "[tlhe OCC may reclassify a
well capitalized bank as adequately capitalized and may require an adequately capital-
ized . . .bank to comply with certain mandatory or discretionary supervisory actions"
when the OCC has made its determinations "after notice and opportunity for hear-
ing . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). This section is especially significant as it applies di-
rectly to solvent institutions that are reclassified from well-capitialized to adequately
capitalized or from adequately capitalized to undercapitalized. According to the plain
language of the code, such a reclassification requires notice and a hearing.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1993) (requiring a notice or "hearing . . .not earlier than
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termination of an institution's status as insured by the FDIC, no such
constitutional safeguards exist for receiverships under section 191.'
The lack of constitutional safeguards must be remedied by either Con-
gress or the courts. 4 2
The various sections of Title 12 lack procedural due process safe-
guards when the OCC appoints the FDIC receiver for a national bank."
In addition, the provisions of FDICIA differ significantly from the pre-
amended sections.M Congress has systematically undermined the Con-
stitution by taking advantage of a marginally effective statute"" and re-
constructing it into an outright violation" which usurps significant con-
stitutional protections. "7 Therefore, the final determination of its consti-
tutionality is evident through an analysis of existing case law.'
1. Case Law
Historically, the Supreme Court established that Congress did not have
the authority to legislate against constitutional protections. In Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.," the Court stated:
It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process
thirty days nor later than sixty days after service of such notice").
140. Under section 1818(a)(2)(B), the FDIC has the authority
[W]ith respect to an insured depository institution [if the FDIC] determines
that any unsafe or unsound practice or condition or any violation specified in
such notice requires the termination of the insured status of the insured de-
pository institution, the Board shall (i) serve written notice to the [bank] of
the Board's intention to terminate ... (ii) provide the [bank] with a state-
ment of the charges on the basis of which the determination to terminate
such institution's insured status was made . . . and (ill) notify the [bank] of
the date. . . and place for a hearing before the Board of Directors...
with respect to the termination of the institution's insured status.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(B) (1993) (emphasis added).
141. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993). In fact, no constitutional protections exist at all.
142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for
Congress to amend 12 U.S.C. § 191 to provide for judicial review.
143. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
144. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text
145. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1991), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
147. Specifically, the fifth and fourteenth amendments are impacted. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
148. If a national bank brings an action against the OCC, the constitutionality of the
FDICIA provisions will be a question of first impression.
149. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
which might be devised. The article [5th amendment] is a restraint on the legisla-
tive as well as the executive and judicial powers of government, and cannot be so
construed as to leave congress free to make any process "due process of law" by
its mere will.'"
In 1877, the Court, in Davidson v. New Orleans,'61 further elaborated
on the due process clause:
[W]hen... there is placed in the Constitution of the United States a declaration
that "no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law" can a State make any thing due process of law which, by its own
legislation, it chooses to declare such?'
Based upon these statements, it appears that the Supreme Court intend-
ed to enforce the due process guarantees of the Constitution. This inher-
ent check on federal and state legislation has always been a critical ele-
ment in protecting the various constitutional safeguards. However, the
historical orations above resolves few issues in the framework of federal
banking regulation and, therefore, whether section 191 is a violation of
such constitutional amendments remains an issue. 15
Modem decisions regarding procedural due process have slightly
switched their rhetoric from the ethereal to the practical. In Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth" the Supreme Court noted: "When
protected interests are implicated the right to some kind of prior hearing
is paramount. But the range of interests protected by procedural due
process is not infinite."" In Roth, the Court emphasized the need for
significant procedural due process safeguards, but indicated that there
are limitations to the protections afforded certain interests. This case
150. Id. at 276.
151. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
152. Id. at 102. The court answered "no." Id.
153. The courts are split, if not opposed, to providing judicial review to some deci-
sions of the OCC. This unfortunate trend should be reversed. A 1992 Practicing Law
Institute article summarized the courts' positions:
The Statutes authorizing the Comptroller of the Currency to appoint a
receiver for a national bank contain no provision for judicial review. Given
the absence of any express review provision and the broad discretionary
language of the appointment statutes, some courts have concluded that the
determination of the Comptroller to appoint a receiver is not judicially re-
viewable. Other courts have concluded that the appointment . . . is judicially
reviewable under the arbitrary or capricious test.... The Tenth Circuit re-
cently declined to state a position on reviewability.
Paul W. Grace, Regulatory Seizure of Banks and Thrifts, April 15, 1992, PLI COMM. L.
& PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 616/177 (1992).
154. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
155. Id. at 569-70. The Court further added that "property interests protected by
procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels,
or money." Id. at 571-72.
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does not resolve whether this limitation extends into the realm of bank-
ing regulations.
The Supreme Court critically examined the issues of procedural due
process in Fuentes v. Shevin." In Fuentes, the Court reviewed the con-
stitutionality of Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes that autho-
rized the seizure of goods under a writ of replevin without notice or any
opportunity to challenge the seizure."' Fuentes had purchased a stove
from Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. and agreed to make monthly pay-
ments for a set period of time." With only a couple of hundred dollars
in payments left, Fuentes disputed the terms of the service contract re-
lating to the stove." In response, Firestone filed a small-claims action
against her." Yet, before Fuentes had received the complaint, Firestone
obtained a replevin order"' requiring a sheriff to retrieve the merchan-
dise in question from Fuentes.'"
The Pennsylvania statute went one step further. Not only did the stat-
ute fail to provide that the party seeking the writ "even formally allege
that he is lawfully entitled to the property,"" but there was no required
post-seizure hearing."
In deciding the issues of the case, the Court proclaimed: "For more
than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been
clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be noti-
fied.'"' The Court focuses on the fundamental right of a person to be
heard, not as a guaranteed victory, but instead as a promise that fairness
and justice will prevail." "[Flairness can rarely be obtained by [a] se-
156. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
157. The Florida statute provided that "'[alny person whose goods or chattels were
wrongfully detained by any other person ... may have a writ of replevin to recover
them . . .'" Id. at 73 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (West 1973)).
158. Id. at 70.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The form which Firestone needed to complete was extremely simple, and
the very day that the court processed the replevin order, a sheriff seized the mer-
chandise from Fuentes. Id. at 71.
162. The Court notes: "There is no requirement that the applicant make a convinc-
ing showing before the seizure .... Rather, Florida law automatically relies on the
bare assertion of the party seeking the writ . ... " Id. at 73-74.
163. Id. at 78.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 80 (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)).
166. The Court added that the purpose of the due process clause
cret, one-sided determination of facts,""7 the Court concluded, and
hence, the critical need to protect procedural due process.
In addition, the Fusentes Court noted:
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that
it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented .... [N]o
later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking
that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already occurred."
In light of the above background, whether the receivership provisions
of FDICIA1" are constitutional is clear: They are not. Regarding insol-
vent institutions, the staple argument of the regulators has been that the
lack of procedural due process is fundamental to protect the public inter-
est.'" Even Fuentes implies support for this notion in theory: "Only in a
few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without
opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been
directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest."7'
The ultimate issue regarding national bank receiverships, however, is
whether such action is constitutionally necessary."' With a myriad of
other procedures available to the banking regulators, placing a bank in
receivership should be a last resort.'7' Incidentally, each successive reg-
ulatory procedure, leading up to receiverships, provides for procedural
due process. Whether it be the removal of a bank officer,'74 a cease and
desist order,'7 a capital reclassification order,'76 or the removal of
is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more
particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary
encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of
property .... So viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation of property
without due process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitu-
tional and political history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what
is his, free of governmental interference.
Id. at 80-81.
167. Id. at 81.
168. Id. at 81-82.
169. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
170. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
171. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91. Furthermore, the Court explains: "A prior hearing
always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and it is often more efficient
to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather ordinary costs
cannot outweigh the constitutional right." Id. at 90 n.22.
172. This issue will be discused in greater detail in Part IV of this Comment under
the review of the arbitrary and capricious standard.
173. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 136.
175. See supra note 139.
176. See supra note 137.
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FDIC insured status,' FDICIA provides for some due process protec-
tion. Therefore, the question is why such a drastic measure, arguably
more severe than any other provision in FDICIA, exists without a scin-
tilla of constitutional protection.
The government argues such provisions are "necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest."" Preventing a run
on a bank, the government argues, merits the denial of procedural due
process." However, depositors may become just as alarmed at the
news of a cease and desist order, the removal of the bank's chairman of
the board, or even the bank's reclassification. An article in a local
newspaper discussing the impending hearing on capital reclassification
may draw the media or just as many depositors to an institution as cov-
erage of a receivership. Therefore, this proverbial "bank run" argument is
unconvincing.
The next issue involves solvent financial institutions. Arguably, it is
never imperative to seize these banks under the guise of the public inter-
est. Solvent banks pose no threat to the insurance fund and certainly
pose no greater threat to depositors.'" Furthermore, the solvent nature
of such a bank favors the argument that other methods are more effective. '
177. See supra note 140.
178. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). In Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988), the Court noted: "An important government
interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless
or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the
opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation." Id. at 240.
179. The Banking Act of 1933 gave rise to this argument-
When banks started failing in large numbers, depositors lost not only their
funds, but all confidence in the banking system as well. Not surprisingly,
many accountholders withdrew their deposits from institutions which re-
mained open. The Federal Reserve could not meet the sudden demand for
cash by these institutions, and many of them also had to close. To stop the
panic bank runs and to restore depositor confidence, Congress decided to in-
sure depositor's accounts.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Improvement Act of 1991; Pub. L. 102-242, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1901, 1902.
180. Regarding insolvent banks, for example, in Gregory v. Mitchell, 459 F. Supp.
1162 (N.D. Ala. 1978), the district court noted: "Summary seizure of a bank . . . with-
out a prior hearing has been approved by many courts, including the Supreme Court
of the United States, on the ground such action is justified by the potential economic
disaster of a bank failure." Id. at 1165-66.
181. With solvent banks, there is no pending economic disaster which is about to
produce disastrous effects on the insurance fund. There was never an impending
economic disaster when regulators seized American Commerce National Bank. After
If insolvency is not at issue in the course of bank examinations, then
clearly some management or internal practice is the problem.'1 There-
fore, FDICIA provides plenty of remedies to regulate practices which the
OCC alleges are violations of banking laws. For example, the OCC can
reclassify even a "well-capitalized" bank as "adequately capitalized" for
discretionary reasons." This process requires notice and a hearing."
Hence, as applied to solvent banks, and arguably even to insolvent
banks, the public need mentioned in Fuentes does not outweigh the
constitutional protections afforded to these financial institutions." Fur-
thermore, in a regulatory seizure of a solvent financial institution, mil-
lions of shareholders' dollars may be at stake. These interests must be
taken into account when the OCC seizes a solvent bank. Therefore, there
are two separate levels of protection: the bank and the shareholders.
Whether one entity deserves a higher level of protection is an important
issue, but since neither entity receives the necessary constitutional safe-
guards, this must be addressed first.
The Supreme Court articulated a fundamental precept of due process
in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill." In that case the
Court declared: "An essential principle of due process is that a depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" ' The nature of a
the regulators seized the bank, however, a mini-economic disaster occurred in Orange
County: Hundreds of small businesses were virtually shut down for the weekend, and
a number of construction loans were terminated, thereby adversely affecting the local
building industry in the midst of a disastrous recession. See generaUy Johnson, supra
note 4, at DI. One construction firm, because of the frozen construction loans, re-
leased seventy-five employees the following week. Id. The FDIC allowed the sale of
only $107,000,000 of bank deposits, thereby depriving 328 families of approximately
$30,000,000, even though the bank was solvent. Id. The FDIC sold to Southern. Cali-
fornia Bank only the insured deposits, the amount up to $100,000. Id. Therefore,
depositors with accounts in excess of $100,000 had to contend with Southern Califor-
nia Bank for the initial amount, and the FDIC for the excess amounts. Id. Finally,
the FDIC selectively chose which creditors to pay, and only paid such creditors sixty
cents on the dollar, even though the bank had been solvent. Id.
182. The OCC seized American Commerce National Bank on the various grounds of
12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5), which applied to internal mismanagement but not to insolven-
cy. Therefore, the OCC used its discretionary authority to allege certain illegal prac-
tices by bank management and seized the institution.
183. See supra note 137.
184. See supra note 137.
185. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
186. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
187. Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306,
313 (1950)); see also Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) (holding that the consideration of procedural due process "must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as
well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action");
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bank regulatory seizure must allow some protection for the shareholders
of a solvent bank. As FDICIA now stands, no protection exists, and judi-
cial recourse is virtually impossible."s
In Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board," the Fifth. Circuit fo-
cused on the adequacy of both pre- and post-deprivation procedures in
determining whether a bank regulatory seizure afforded the proper
protections of due process.." The court, agreeing with plaintiffs argu-
ment that "the absence of pre-deprivation process heightens the need for
post-deprivation procedures,"' balanced the competing interests be-
tween the two parties." On the one hand, the government insures de-
posits of such institutions, and congressional legislation addresses the
need to preserve confidence in the system through strong regulation."
On the other hand, the private interests of shareholders in solvent finan-
cial institutions must be protected under the Constitution.
The court in Woods held that the various interests were inferior to the
interests mentioned in Fuentes.' In Fuentes, the limited interest in-
volved replevin statutes that authorized the seizure of goods under a writ
of replevin without notice or any opportunity to challenge the seizure."
In Woods, however, the bank was insolvent." Furthermore, the court in
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Whether any procedural protections
are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss.'"); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987) ("Deter-
mining the adequacy of predeprivation procedures requires consideration of the
Government's interest in imposing the temporary deprivation, the private interests of
those affected by the deprivation, the risk of erroneous deprivations through the chal-
lenged procedures, and the probable .value of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards.").
188. See infra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
189. 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
190. The court noted: "The exceptionally strong government interest in administering
FSLIC insurance and the unique statutory position occupied by the Bank Board which
requires no pre-deprivation hearing combine to present us with the reverse of the
situation found in most procedural due process cases." Id. at 1411.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. In Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), the Court noted: "Banking is one of
the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public callings. It is one in
which accumulated experience of supervisors, acting for many states under various
statutes, has established well-defined practices for the appointment of conservators,
receivers and liquidators." Id. at 250.
194. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1411; see supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
195. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73 (1972).
196. In Branch v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 825 F. Supp. 384 (D. Mass.
Woods notes that there was no surprise to the plaintiffs: "Not only was
there a formal cease and desist proceeding, but also these same plaintiffs
filed the initial action in this case in June 1986, some three months be-
fore the Bank Board appointed the receiver."'97
Under a typical section 191 scenario, the institution seized can be both
solvent and completely unaware of the pending receivership."' The
court in Woods did not address this possibility, but regarding future situa-
tions, the court advised: "What due process may require 'in dealing with
one set of interests which it protects may not be required in dealing with
another set of interests.""' Section 191 of FDICIA2® addresses an en-
tirely different "set of interests" than the courts have yet addressed.
Therefore, the acceptance of the receivership statutes in Woods" must
not be confused by the courts as approval of FDICIA. A comparison
between the interests in Woods and those under FDICIA yield virtually
no similarities.
Another case somewhat mirroring the logic of FDICIA is Franklin
Savings Association v. Office of Thrift Supervision.' In Franklin, the
Tenth Circuit reversed a district court decision placing the bank back
into the hands of its old directors."°  The court of appeal dismissed the
bank's argument that the action by the Office of Thrift Supervision failed
to provide procedural due process. The court noted: "[Title 12] affords
the association to which a conservator has been appointed the opportu-
nity for judicial review of the appointment decision. The availability of
this post-deprivation hearing precludes any due process violations." '
This logic offers no substantial guidance to courts in reviewing
FDICIA's receivership statutes. ' The court in Franklin justified no pre-
conservatorship hearing because of the presence of judicial review of a
previous administrative decision." In theory, this might be an ample
solution to any questionable seizure of a national bank; however, in prac-
tice such logic is troubling. If a solvent bank is seized on a Friday and
sold the following Monday, irreparable harm could ensue. 7 Thereafter,
1993), the court held that the OCC can appoint a receiver for any national bank
when the bank becomes insolvent. There is no mention of solvent banks. Id. at 391.
197. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1412.
198. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
199. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1410-11 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155
(1974)).
200. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
201. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1413.
202. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
203. Id. at 1140.
204. Id.
205. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
206. Pranklin, 934 F.2d at 1140.
207. American Commerce National Bank was seized on a Friday and sold the fol-
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at the very least, shareholder interest would be eliminated and depositor
confidence might vanish virtually overnight. Fearing a future takeover or
some other regulatory measure, even if the receivership were removed,
few depositors would cease to be concerned.
Therefore, no judicial review, not even by the Supreme Court of the
United States, could remedy the situation and return the bank to its pre-
receivership conditions. While there may be claims against the govern-
ment or other parties, this remedy pales in comparison to the damage
done. Hence, judicial review of an administrative agency's decision sim-
ply does not work in practice, and the logic of the Franklin court like-
wise fails.
While section 191 does not provide for judicial review, the statute does
not prohibit such review;' it is certainly within the discretion of the
courts to correct this constitutional violation. In Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation v. Bank of Coushatta,2" the Fifth Circuit discussed
the review procedures for capital directives and the applicable Fifth
Amendment due process considerations. The court noted: "[In the ab-
sence of an express prohibition, there is a 'strong presumption that Con-
gress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of [the] decision.9 210
Perhaps the courts will begin to reexamine their interpretation of
FDICIA's receivership sections and the unchecked authority granted to
federal regulatory agencies.
In summary, 12 U.S.C. § 191 is unconstitutional as a violation of proce-
dural due process. Because the courts have yet to decide the issue of
national bank receiverships in the context of solvent banks, case law
provides an opportunity for where the courts can begin.1
lowing Monday to Southern California Bank. See Johnson, supra note 4, at Dl.
208. See 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
209. 930 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 170 (1991).
210. Id. at 1128 (quoting Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975)). Further-
more, the court in Dunlop noted: "Only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing
evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial
review." Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 567 (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
(1967)).
211. Even the OCC is unable to decide how § 191 applies to solvent national
banks. While the OCC seized American Commerce National Bank, a solvent bank,
under the grounds mentioned in 12 U.S.C. §§ 191 and 1821(c)(5), a February 25,
1993, circular produced by the Comptroller of the Currency clouds the issue whether
such statutes apply to solvent banks. Here, the Comptroller lists the grounds for the
appointment of a receiver under the general heading of "Capital Restoration Plan"
that applies to undercapitalized and insolvent institutions. While the intent of the
Although there has been no definitive resolution of procedural due
process issues, the Administrative Conference of the United States has
made recommendations regarding section 191.2 In particular, the Con-
ference states: "Congress should amend section 2 of the National Bank
Receivership Act, 12 U.S.C. 191, to provide for judicial review of deci-
sions to appoint receivers for national banks.""3 Although this is not an
authoritative decision, it does lend significant weight to the argument
that something must be done regarding FDICIA's receivership sections.
The constitutional violations relating to national banks must be ad-
dressed by legislation, and if not, then by the courts.1 4
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR OCC DECISIONS
In general, one standard of review, the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, applies to the bank regulators upon creation of receiverships for
any national bank."1 5 In Franklin, the court established "an appointment
decision may be set aside only if the decision was 'arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'1 6
Due to the discretionary nature of the grounds listed in section
Comptroller is clear, the OCC has nevertheless interpreted that section of the text to
apply to virtually any institution, regardless of solvency. The ambiguities between the
interpretations of the regulations by the Comptroller of the Currency and by the actu-
al federal agents must be resolved. See Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60,52OXX
(Banking Cir. 268 Feb. 25, 1993).
212. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
213. 58 Fed. Reg. 45, 412 (1993).
214. "[Tlhe central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified.'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)).
215. While the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is almost universally em-
ployed, courts will occasionally apply another. See, e.g., Telegraph Sav. and Loan
Ass'n. v Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 564 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ill. 1982), offd, 703
F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.) (applying a greater weight of the evidence standard), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
216. Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 1142, cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992)(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); see also Syracuse Peace
Council v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 867 F.2d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing the F.C.C. to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1019 (1990); Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1406 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that a receiver may be appointed under the proper arbitrary and
capricious standard of review), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Gregory v. Mitchell,
459 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (holding the State Banking Board to an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review). Furthermore, the court in Franklin not-
ed that "the scope of review is ordinarily limited to the agency record before the
director at the time he made his decision." Id.
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1821(c)(5)" 7 that warrant the appointment of receiverships, there is
something inherently wrong with this standard of review. While this
Comment does not attempt to tackle the standard of review for adminis-
trative agencies in general, this level of review raises significant issues as
applied to the OCC and as documented by various "suspect" takeovers.
In Franklin, the court noted some instances when administrative agen-
cy decisions may be overturned:
[Wie must uphold the agency's actions, findings, and conclusions unless they are:
outside the agency's statutory authority; unsupported by substantial evidence;
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law; contrary to a constitutional right or privilege; without obser-
vance of required procedure; or unwarranted by the facts to the extent the facts
are subject to a trial de novo by the reviewing court."'
In Franklin, as in most court decisions, the reviewing appellate court
deferred to the administrative record rather than the independent fact-
findings of the district court.219 The seemingly impossible burden of re-
versing OCC decisions is troubling. Recognizing a significant shortcoming
in federal regulation of national banks, Congress increased the OCC's
power at the expense of others' constitutional rights.'o
The United States Supreme Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,"2  spoke about the dangers of
government agents: "An agent acting - albeit unconstitutionally - in the
217. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
218. F anklin, 934 F.2d at 1142. See also United States v. Carlo Bianchi and Co.,
373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963) ("[fln cases where Congress has simply provided for review,
without setting forth the standards to be used or procedures to be followed, this
Court has held that consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and
that no de novo proceeding may be held."). Finally, the Franklin court noted: "A re-
viewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Franklin, 934
F.2d at 1142.
219. Id. at 1142; see also Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400,
1406 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that consideration is to be confined to the administra-
tive record), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1992); Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall,
743 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that "review requires judicial deference
to the agency's judgment").
220. The Prompt Corrective Action came about because Congress was "concerned
that regulators have too often delayed in resolving the problems of troubled institu-
tions." S. Rep. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). In his report to the Senate
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, economist James Barth stated: "[Tihe
regulatory authorities have the power, have had the power, do have the power, and
will have the power to do their job. That's why, unfortunately, I don't think that
they've done a good job .... (Congress] must require that they do their job." Id.
221. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than
an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own." '
Unfortunately, these words fit the OCC when its seemingly unchecked
authority runs awry.' After all, when the agency seizes a national
bank, acts as the judge, jury, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorney.
An unfortunate "Catch-22" situation exists in the gray area surrounding
OCC authority and national bank autonomy. National banks have very
little means to challenge decisions of the OCC. It does not take a bank
chairman or president very long to realize this and that a governmental
agency must be treated in the most obsequious manner. In addition,
banks already subject to the discretionary decisions of the OCC can, at
most, muster an "arbitrary and capricious" defense.'
First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc. filed a complaint against the
FDIC on September 24, 1993, alleging that the OCC and FDIC's receiver-
ship appointment was "wrongful, unlawful, and done in egregious and
reckless disregard for the rights of those banks, and of their
shareholders, creditors, and depositors. " 5 American Commerce Na-
tional Bank has also filed a complaint against the OCC and other authori-
ties alleging similar wrongdoing. 6
The fight between such national banks and the OCC, however, extends
beyond simple court cases; 7 the battle often becomes quite personal.
After regulators seized American Commerce National Bank, the OCC
launched a mini-media campaign to justify its actions.' The OCC al-
222. Id. at 392.
223. In an article on bank regulation, Elizabeth Costle, Commissioner of the Ver-
mont Department of Banking, Insurance and Securities stated: "Banks are more regu-
lated than ... their entities. And, I would say, that regulators have gone too far."
Where Do Banks Go From Here?, VERMONT BUSINESS MAGAZINE, Dec. 1992, at 22.
224. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
225. Complaint for Plaintiffs at 15, First City Bancorp. of Tex., Inc. v. Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp., No. 4:93cv242 (E.D. Tex., September 24, 1993). Ultimately, the FDIC
settled this case with First City Bankcorp. of Texas.
226. See generally Complaint for Plaintiffs, Garner v. Blake, No. CV 93-6674 MRP
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1993).
227. The battles are often very expensive. A recent study by the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC") has revealed that the regulatory burden on
the banking industry is more than $17.5 billion a year in compliance costs. The re-
port also notes that "[olverly detailed regulation can create inefficiencies by prevent-
ing the institutions themselves from responding appropriately to regulatory require-
ments and changing conditions." Regulatory Compliance Costs Banks $17.5 Billion a
Year, FFIEC Study Says, 12 No. 1 BANKING POL'Y REP. 4 (1993).
228. The OCC sent numerous releases to the press. The OCC also posted a notice
on the bank door the day of the seizure explaining the nature of its actions. This
explanation described the seizure in terms of the actions of the bank directors, spe-
cifically the chairman of the board. Though the notice arguably was defamatory in
nature, the government is immune from such torts under the Federal Tort Claims
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leged insider abuse and concealment of records. Among other things, the
OCC decided it must put the bank "in receivership - rather than try to
conserve its loans, investments and other assets - because the 'pervasive
concealment and falsification of bank records' made it impossible to
determine the extent of the bank's unsafe and unsound condition. " '
One article stated the events of April 30, 1993 occurred as follows:
"[Tlhe OCC sent 100 bank regulators to the American Commerce Nation-
al Bank in Anaheim, locked its doors and bodily tossed out its officers
and directors. The bank cowboys smashed all logos and emblems of the
bank. Directors' pictures were broken."'
The battle between the OCC and American Commerce National Bank
is as interesting as it is tragic. Allegations of personal vendettas23 and
anti-semitism against the board of directors 2 are pitted against the
crimes of concealing records and lying to government regulators.'m Un-
fortunately, while such a fight may ultimately reach the judicial system,
the directors and shareholders of the bank do not enjoy a level playing
field. Held to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, national
banks must first prove bad faith on the part of the regulators before a
court will even hear their claims of abuse, not to mention the underlying
constitutional issues.
For American Commerce National Bank, the bad faith argument may
prevail. However, with a plethora of options that would have essentially
eliminated any problems,' the OCC decided instead to wield its most
potent weapon: a receivership.'m Perhaps the best argument for Ameri-
can Commerce National Bank is that 12 U.S.C. §§ 191 and 1821(c)(5) ap-
ply only to insolvent and undercapitalized institutions and therefore the
OCC's decision to apply such statutes to the bank was arbitrary.
Act. See Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
229. See Granelli, supra note 1, at D3.
230. Herb Brin, Bank "Cowboys" Anti-Semitic, ORANGE COUNTY HERITAGE, Sept. 24,
1993, at 1.
231. According to a sworn affidavit, OCC agents approached a bank customer and
told him they would relieve his loan obligations if he could provide any incriminating
evidence against American Commerce National Bank. Complaint for Plaintiffs at 12,
Garner v. Blake, No. CV 93-6674 MRP (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1993).
232. See generally id.
233. See generally Statement of Uncontroverted Facts by Defendants, Garner v.
Blake, No. CV 93-6674 MRP (C.D. Cal. March 14, 1994).
234. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
235. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1993).
In a court of law, American Commerce National Bank must systemati-
cally disprove each allegation under 12 U.S.C. 1821(c)(5), according to
the aforementioned standard of review. With such a difficult task and the
fact that the OCC is in complete control of all bank records as of April
30, 1993, it is no wonder that few banks actually challenge the decisions
of the agency.
V. CONCLUSION
Well then, as I was saying, perhaps the insatiable desire for [liberty] ... to the
neglect of everything else may transform a democracy and lead to a demand for
despotism. A democratic state may fall under the influence of unprincipled lead-
ers, ready to minister to its thirst for liberty with too deep draughts of this heady
win.'
[T]he culmination of liberty in democracy is precisely what prepares the way for
the cruelest extreme of servitude under a despot. 7
The regulatory seizure of American Commerce National Bank, and
other small national banks, inevitably leads to a chilling affect in the
industry. With federal charters and civil money penalties at stake, bank
officers and directors are reluctant to run the risk of agitating an agent
from the OCC, FDIC, or other regulatory agency.2' The punishment,
however, often falls on the customer. In the final analysis, customer ser-
vice may have a lower priority than regulatory compliance.
According to David Robertson, "[tjhe general rule in this country is
that you can't go out and seize people's property without going to court
first and giving the person a hearing." m Regarding FDICIA, common
236. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 288 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 1941).
237. Id. at 290.
238. For those bank officers who actually oppose the regulatory agencies, the story
can be tragic:
In his last days, just before Thanksgiving 1992, Scott Cone had become
sad, even tearful. He was also frightened, sure that the FBI was following
him and tapping his phone. Cone had been chief financial officer for Land-
mark Land Co .... But Landmark had been taken over by federal regula-
tors .... Cone, 39 years old, was jobless in a deepening recession and
banned for life from banking. He owed his defense lawyers an overwhelming
sum, and he was also alone, having divorced his wife of 18 years, Debby, to
distance his family from his mounting personal and professional problems.
The Sunday night before Thanksgiving, Scott Cone took the family's
shotgun, put it to his head, and pulled the trigger. He left no note for his
wife and two children, but the source of his despair was clear. He was
wearing a T-shirt some Landmark employees had made up in a moment of
defiance against the government. It had RTC printed on it, circled and
slashed through in red.
Dickenson, supra note 15, at 93.
239. Sharon Walsh, Long Reach of S&L Regulators Shakes Law Firms, WASH. POST.,
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sense and logic leads to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional. How-
ever, the trend has been to allow government intervention whenever the
government deems it necessary. At stake are billions of dollars in taxpay-
er money. Superficially, it is difficult to argue that the rights of one indi-
vidual financial institution outweigh the rights of taxpayers.
However, also at stake are the constitutional safeguards afforded these
national banks, their shareholders and customers. Such fundamental
rights apply to all taxpayers, not just those connected with a solvent fi-
nancial institution. This historical avenue for government mismanage-
ment and over-zealous regulation must be terminated. FDICIA has gone
too far with its grandiose legislative intent to save the banking industry.
FDICIA in certain contexts may be viewed as the problem, not the solu-
tion.
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